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UNDERSTANDING STRENGTH OF WILL 
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Richard Holton has presented an important criticism of two prominent 
accounts of action, a criticism that employs a notion of strength of will.  
Holton claims that these well-known accounts of action cannot explain 
cases in which an agent adheres to the dictates of a previous resolution in 
spite of a persistent desire to the contrary.  In this chapter, I present an 
explanation and defense of Holton’s criticism of these accounts of action, 
and then I argue that while Holton highlights a crucial deficiency in both, 
his own explanation of strength of will is problematic. 
1. Strength of will as adherence to a resolution 
How do you succeed in persisting with a resolution in the face of a 
compelling desire to the contrary? For example, imagine that you have 
recently decided to give up espresso and that you now desire to refrain 
from doing so. Imagine further that unaware of your decision I present you 
with the opportunity to drink a freshly brewed espresso from your favorite 
café and you find yourself with a compelling desire to accept my offer, 
one whose influence is felt more powerfully than your previous desire. In 
spite of this strong desire, though, you refrain from accepting my offer, 
thereby adhering to your previous decision and displaying what shall here 
be called strength of will. According to Richard Holton, two prominent 
accounts of action cannot explain cases in which you manage to do this 
sort of thing.1 He describes the two accounts2 as follows:  
 
The Humean Account: All action is explained in terms of your beliefs and 
desires, where you act on whichever of your desires are strongest.3 On this 
account, when you adhere to the dictates of a resolution, the resolution 
itself must be understood either as the strongest desire or the strongest 
combination of beliefs and desires.  
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The Modified Humean Account: All action is explained in terms of your 
beliefs, desires, and intentions, where intentions are a sui generis kind of 
motivational factor, irreducible to the other two, and where you act on 
whichever motivational factor is strongest.4 On this account, when you 
adhere to the dictates of a resolution, the resolution itself is the strongest 
motivational factor.  
 
How might a proponent of the Humean Account of action explain such 
cases? According to Holton, the most promising way to explain strength of 
will on the Humean Account is as follows. Using the above example, after 
deciding that you should give up espresso, you thereby come to desire that 
you refrain from drinking espresso rather than doing so. When presented 
with the opportunity to drink a freshly brewed cup from your favorite café, 
though, you are confronted with a compelling desire to drink it, a desire 
that is felt more powerfully than the previous desire to refrain from 
drinking. If the Humean Account of action is correct and you must act on 
your strongest desire, then you will succumb to the compelling desire to 
drink espresso and thereby fail to display strength of will. So how might 
people who are confronted with this pattern of desires show strength of 
will? What might the proponent of the Humean Account say?  
Holton identifies two options, one in which further desires are added to 
the mix, and another that involves adding further beliefs. For the first 
option, Holton suggests that the proponent of the Humean Account could 
add a strong desire to adhere to your previous decision, thereby 
understanding a resolution as special kind of desire that is designed to 
block compelling desires to the contrary.5 Here, a resolution is a second-
order desire to be unmoved by particular first-order desires. Thus, at the 
moment in time when you are confronted with a compelling desire to drink 
an espresso, provided that your second-order desire to be unmoved by 
precisely this kind of first-order desire is stronger than the first-order 
desire itself, you have a desire-driven way in which you can resist the 
temptation to break with your previous decision.  
For the second option, Holton suggests that the proponent of the 
Humean Account could add a further belief rather than an additional 
desire.6 The belief in question involves accepting two propositions: (a) if 
you resist the next espresso, you will give up drinking espresso for good; 
(b) if you fail to resist the next cup of espresso, you will fail to give up 
drinking espresso for good. The first proposition expresses the idea that 
resisting the next cup of espresso will be an effective means of giving up 
espresso for good, so that accepting the proposition will enable you to 
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believe that resisting the desire to drink the next cup of espresso will play 
an instrumental role in realizing your desire to give up espresso for good. 
The second proposition expresses the idea that resisting the next cup of 
espresso is necessary in order for you to be successful in giving up 
espresso for good, so that accepting the proposition will enable you to 
avoid believing that you can both drink the next cup of espresso and be 
successful in giving up espresso for good. Here, a resolution is a two-
pronged belief that is designed to reinforce the motivational power of your 
decision in the presence of strong inclinations to do otherwise. Thus, at the 
moment when you are confronted with a compelling desire to drink a cup 
of espresso, provided that you believe both propositions to be true, you 
have a belief-driven way in which you can strengthen your desire to resist 
the temptation to break with your previous decision.  
Now, according to Holton, neither option saves the Humean Account 
of action from the charge of implausibility. Why? Even if we incorporate 
the above responses into the Humean Account, it maintains that adhering 
to a resolution consists in the triumph of a stronger desire over a weaker 
one, a victory that occurs in any situation in which you act in light of your 
strongest desire. Thus, if the Humean Account were correct, then we 
would expect that the experience of acting in light of your strongest desire 
in mundane cases would be just like or identical to the experience of 
acting in accordance with a resolution in the face of a compelling desire to 
the contrary, since in both cases your action results simply from the 
triumph of a stronger desire over a weaker one. But this is not correct, says 
Holton, for it is often the case that you must struggle to maintain a 
resolution in the face of a desire to do otherwise. That is, it is often the 
case that you adhere to a resolution only by way of struggling to resist or 
overcome a compelling desire to the contrary. The struggle to maintain a 
resolution in such circumstances is importantly different from what occurs 
when you make a decision amongst a variety of mundane options or 
simply act in light of your strongest desire, and Holton is correct to point 
out that such struggle is omitted by the Humean Account of action 
precisely because the account explains action only in terms of beliefs and 
desires, where you act on whichever desire is strongest.   
How might we explain this kind of struggle? Holton suggests that we 
might augment the Humean Account along the lines suggested by 
proponents of the Modified Humean Account of action. In so doing, 
intentions are understood to be neither desires nor a conjunction of desires 
and beliefs, but as a unique kind of mental state, irreducible to the other 
two. Intentions are motivating states that can move one to act and that can 
preserve the motivational force of an earlier belief or desire, even if the 
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earlier belief or desire is no longer present to mind, and even if there are 
contrary desires urging one to do otherwise. On this account, a resolution 
can be seen as a particular kind of intention that one forms precisely so as 
to defeat any contrary desires that might emerge at a later point in time. 
It is worth emphasizing the ways in which this Modified Account of a 
resolution differs from that offered by proponents of the Humean Account. 
On the Modified Account, the number of motivational factors is enlarged, 
so that to be motivated to act, one need not require a desire and a belief, 
and action need not be the result of whichever desire is the strongest. An 
intention can exert its own kind of motivational force, so that even in the 
absence of the desire or belief that gave rise to it in the first place, the 
intention can overcome whatever desires are present at the time of action. 
Rather than saying that one acts always to satisfy one’s strongest desire, 
the Modified Account claims that one acts always in light of one’s 
strongest motivational factor, which includes one’s beliefs, desires, and 
intentions. Thus, when an agent adheres to the dictates of a resolution, the 
resolution itself is the strongest motivational factor.  
Holton thinks that the Modified Humean Account of action is in 
trouble for the same reason that he thinks that the original Humean 
Account is problematic. The trouble is that both accounts omit a crucial 
element that is present in many cases where one adheres to the dictates of 
a resolution: namely, the struggle required when forcing oneself to remain 
resolute in the face of a desire to the contrary. The Modified Account of a 
resolution construes success in such cases in terms of the strength of a 
particular motivational factor, so that strength of will occurs when one lets 
the strongest of one’s motivational factors have its way. Here, the struggle 
that can occur in situations where one displays of strength of will is not 
accounted for. I shall say more about Holton’s criticism below, after 
introducing his account of strength of will.  
2. Holton’s account of strength of will 
Holton thinks that the best way to explain strength of will is by 
introducing another motivational factor into the equation, namely, that of 
willpower. Introducing the notion of willpower enables us to explain 
strength of will in terms of your beliefs, desires, intentions and the 
strength of your willpower, understood as a separate factor. According to 
Holton, the notion of willpower is that of a cognitive capacity that you 
actively employ as such. It can be likened to a muscle, insofar as it 
requires a distinctive kind of effort to use, it can tire in the short term, and 
it can be strengthened over time. Explaining strength of will in terms of a 
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distinctive notion of willpower incorporates the fact that often times you 
must struggle in order to resist the temptation of a compelling desire that 
threatens to subvert your resolution. The struggle itself is something that 
you do or do not exert, and Holton claims that it is required because you 
are actively employing your willpower in the attempt to overcome a desire 
to the contrary. That is, the struggle is evidence that you are using a 
distinctive cognitive capacity to remain resolute in the presence of a desire 
to do otherwise.  
Crucially, for Holton the struggle to resist a compelling desire is not 
straightforwardly physical, such as that involved when lifting a heavy 
object or walking uphill, since it can be present whether the resolution is to 
perform an action or to refrain from performing an action. Holton claims 
that no matter how strong the desire to drink espresso might be, it is not 
the case that the struggle to resist it consists in actually preventing muscles 
that are straining to reach for the cup. Rather, the struggle involved in 
resisting a desire that threatens to thwart a resolution is best understood as 
mental. In particular, it is the mental act of refusing to revise a resolution 
by not reconsidering it, in spite of the presence of a powerful inclination to 
do just that.7 The state of mind in question is one in which you are aware 
of the resolution, and perhaps even the consideration(s) for which it was 
originally adopted, but it is not reconsidered or reevaluated. You merely 
call it to mind in a kind of passive rehearsal, and you do not allow yourself 
to embark on a procedure that would be involved in revising it. Here, you 
must struggle in order to call to mind the resolution at precisely the 
moment at which it is being threatened by a competing inclination to do 
otherwise. When all goes well, you are able to resist the tempting course 
of action by refusing to revise and reconsider a resolution designed to 
prohibit that very course of action.8 Thus, strength of will is the ability to 
retain a firm and unwavering commitment to your resolution by calling the 
resolution to mind at the moment in time when it is needed and refusing to 
reconsider or alter it in any way. 
What evidence is there that such a distinct capacity exists? Holton 
provides three sources of evidence that the capacity is distinct, each from 
recent research in social psychology. First, the ability to abide by a 
resolution looks to be affected by factors that are distinct from the beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and resolutions themselves. For example, reformed 
alcoholics, dieters, and people who are trying to quit smoking are more 
likely to forgo their commitment to abstaining from alcohol, food, or 
cigarettes when they are depressed, anxious, or tired.9 States of this kind 
systematically affect your ability to act in line with all of your resolutions, 
be they resolutions not to drink, not to over-eat, not to smoke, or whatever. 
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According to Holton, the most likely explanation of this fact is that such 
states do not systematically strengthen your desires to perform the 
prohibited actions, but rather they inhibit your ability to follow any 
resolution that you might have formed.  
Second, it appears that willpower is limited. For example, forcing 
yourself to eat radishes rather than chocolate makes you less likely to 
persist later on in solving a difficult puzzle, and suppressing your 
emotional reactions to a film makes you less likely to persist later on in 
maintaining your grip on a handle.10 According to Holton, the most likely 
explanation of such facts is that the ability to sustain a resolution is 
affected by the strength of your willpower at that moment in time. That is, 
it seems that the ability to persist in a course of action is determined not 
simply by the strength of your desires, beliefs, intentions, and resolutions, 
but also by the strength of your willpower, precisely that motivational 
factor that appears to be depleted by repeated or earlier use.   
Third, it seems that your willpower can be developed and strengthened 
by repeated practice. Experimental subjects who undergo a regime of self-
regulatory exercises, such as working on the improvement of posture, 
display a significantly reduced tendency to suffer from depletion of 
willpower.11 Much like Aristotle’s claim that you can become virtuous by 
acting virtuously, it appears that you can become strong-willed by acting 
in precisely that way. 
As Holton himself admits, such evidence does not conclusively prove 
that such a capacity exists, but I think he is correct to suggest that it 
provides additional and compelling grounds to think that there is a distinct 
cognitive capacity that is employed when actively recalling and refusing to 
reconsider a resolution in the face of compelling desires to do just that. 
Indeed, postulating the existence of such a capacity does seem to be a 
promising way of explaining the distinctive kind of struggle that is 
displayed in cases where you act in this kind of strong-willed manner. As 
they currently stand, both the original Humean Account and the Modified 
version do not have the resources for explaining the characteristic struggle 
that you exert when overcoming a strong desire that threatens to 
undermine a resolution. Both depict the strong-willed agent in an 
impoverished way, omitting a crucial feature of action that seems present 
in many different situations. However, although Holton has raised an 
important and successful criticism of both accounts of action, his own 
explanation of strength of will is not without its difficulties, as we shall 
see in the next section.  
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3. Problems for Holton 
There are two related reasons why Holton’s account of strength of will 
is problematic. The first concerns the causal necessity of the mental action 
of recalling the relevant resolution and refusing to revise it, and the second 
concerns its relative causal strength. Holton has not offered an explanation 
of the causal process by which strength of will occurs in the kind of case 
introduced in §1, nor has he specified why displaying strength of will 
requires that you recall a resolution and refuse to revise it, rather than, say, 
simply refusing to perform the pertinent action. The second problem is 
that, rather surprisingly, Holton’s account of strength of will lacks an 
explication of the notion of strength. The result is that it is unclear whether 
his account is applicable in cases where an action that is already underway 
is threatened by a pernicious desire. Let’s examine each in turn.12  
First, Holton says very little about how we are to understand the 
mental action of refusal. Specifically, he does not offer an explanation of 
its causal role in enabling you to overcome the powerful desire that 
threatens to undermine your resolution and thereby refrain from 
performing the relevant action. We are thus left wondering why as a 
strong-willed agent it is necessary that you recall the resolution and 
actively refuse to revise it as part of the process by which you overcome 
the pernicious desire. For instance, Holton does not specify whether 
refusing to alter the resolution thereby increases its relative motivational 
strength, or whether it diminishes or altogether blocks the motivational 
force of the problematic desire, or whether it functions in another way 
altogether. As a result, it is unclear whether, for the strong-willed agent, 
the act of recalling the resolution and refusing to alter it makes that 
resolution stronger than the threatening desire, or whether that act 
suppresses the motivational strength of the threatening desire without 
affecting that of the resolution, or something else entirely. Moreover, even 
if we assume on Holton’s behalf that the act of recall and refusal functions 
in one of these ways, how does doing so enable you to refrain from 
performing an action that would satisfy the threatening desire? After all, it 
seems possible that two otherwise indistinguishable agents, both of whom 
have previously resolved to refrain from drinking espresso and are 
presently confronted with an equally potent desire to drink a freshly 
brewed cup, might successfully recall that resolution and refuse to alter it 
in any way, and yet one such agent drinks the espresso whereas the other 
agent does not. From a causal perspective, what might explain the 
difference between such otherwise identical agents? The account presented 
by Holton suggests only that strong-willed agents tend to be capable of 
Chapter Eleven 
 
 
172
refusing to alter the relevant resolution, but this does not explain the causal 
process by which refusing to alter a resolution can enable one agent but 
not the other to refrain from performing the relevant action. As a result, we 
are left wanting an explanation of the difference between such otherwise 
identical agents, from the perspective of the causal factors at work. I shall 
return to this point below.  
In addition, Holton has not explained why the action of recalling and 
refusing to revise your resolution is a causally necessary feature of the 
process by which you display strength of will. Thus, his account does not 
rule out the possibility that you can overcome a potentially threatening 
desire not by refusing to revise your resolution, but by refusing to perform 
the relevant action. Holton assumes that in cases where you display 
strength of will, the problematic desire is a desire that threatens your prior 
resolution. This, however, is not obviously correct. When confronted with 
the opportunity to drink an espresso and the very potent desire to do so, 
that desire seems to threaten your resolution only indirectly. In order for 
the newly acquired desire to threaten your resolution, it seems that you 
must be aware of the conflict between this new desire and your resolution, 
and that succumbing to this new desire would thereby undermine the 
latter. But even granting you an awareness of this, why must you also 
refuse to revise your resolution so as to avoid drinking the espresso? Why 
not refuse to drink it outright, as it were, without refusing to revise your 
resolution? The mental action of recalling and refusing to revise your 
resolution is a potentially unnecessary step in the process by which you 
overcome a pernicious desire, so Holton owes an explanation of why it 
should play this role. 
Now, the second reason why the account of strength of will offered by 
Holton is problematic is that, rather surprisingly, it lacks an exposition of 
the notion of strength. Willpower, says Holton, is a cognitive capacity the 
direct exercise of which consists in the mental action of recalling a 
resolution and refusing to reconsider it. If this cognitive capacity is 
sufficiently robust, then doing so will enable you to succeed in adhering to 
your resolution. But what does it mean for this cognitive capacity to be 
sufficiently robust? In what does its relative strength consist? Holton does 
not say, and this is problematic. This is problematic because there are 
cases in which recalling a resolution and refusing to reconsider it seems to 
be causally insufficient, yet you nevertheless display strength of will. For 
example, consider a scenario in which you display strength of will when 
persisting in the performance of an action that is already underway. 
Imagine that after a lengthy process of deliberation you recently decided to 
run a marathon, formed a resolution to do so, and embarked on an 
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ambitious training plan. Imagine further that today is the day of the race, 
conditions are normal, and you are in the midst of running the twenty-third 
mile. As you are nearing the end of that mile, you are suddenly confronted 
with a very strong desire to give up: you are in pain and near exhaustion, 
you no longer believe that you can finish the race, and you desire to stop 
running more so than you desire to finish. Finally, imagine that in spite of 
all this, you manage to overcome that desire, pain, and near exhaustion 
and complete the marathon, thereby adhering to your resolution and 
displaying strength of will.  
Does Holton’s account apply in such cases? That is, does his account 
explain how it is that you are able to force yourself to continue running in 
spite of your newly acquired desire, the pain and exhaustion, and lack of 
self-confidence, thereby adhering to your resolution and displaying 
strength of will? The example suggests that, in cases where an action is 
already underway, adhering to your original resolution requires more than 
calling it to mind and refusing to revise it. In addition, while you are in the 
midst of exercising what Holton describes as willpower, you must also 
force yourself to remain in motion while overcoming the new desire to 
stop, the looming self-doubt, and the pain and near exhaustion. That is, 
you must also exert a great amount of effort so as to force your legs to 
remain in motion in spite of the potent desire to stop running the race.  
Crucially, the exertion of effort required to sustain and control your 
bodily capacities in such demanding scenarios is different from that 
required to recall your resolution and refuse to alter it, insofar as it is 
deployed in a distinctively bodily manner to sustain the ongoing activity of 
the requisite bodily capacities. Such effort is not accounted for by Holton’s 
description of what happens when you display strength of will, since his 
account restricts the applicability of the notion of effort to the use of the 
relevant cognitive capacity when refusing to alter a resolution. Displaying 
strength of will in cases of this kind requires that you continue to perform 
the relevant bodily action the moment that your newly acquired desire to 
stop running is felt more powerfully than your resolution to continue, as 
well as during your recall of the resolution, and even as you refuse to alter 
your resolution. In each moment during this process of recall and refusal, 
you remain in motion as a result of your ongoing exertion of effort, which 
sustains the movement of your legs and body, and which is distinct from 
the effort that you exert while using the cognitive capacity that figures in 
Holton’s account. Thus, since Holton restricts the applicability of the 
notion of willpower by construing it as a cognitive capacity that you 
employ specifically when refusing to alter a resolution in light of a 
pernicious desire, his account does not apply in situations where the 
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relevant action is already underway and the effort that you exert so as to 
continue performing that action is more than merely cognitive. 
4. Beyond mere adherence 
Once we acknowledge this wider causal role of your exertion of effort 
during the performance of your action, we can provide a more persuasive 
and comprehensive account of strength of will. Recall the above-
mentioned agents who are otherwise indistinguishable and who have both 
resolved to avoid drinking espresso and yet only one manages to adhere to 
the relevant resolution when confronted with a potent desire to drink an 
espresso. From the perspective of the relevant causal factors at work, the 
difference between these agents is not explained merely in terms of their 
awareness of the relevant resolution, their recalling it in the way that 
Holton describes, and their refusal to alter it. That is, when confronted 
with such a compelling desire, the act of recalling and refusing to revise 
that resolution can be a part of the process by which a potent desire to the 
contrary is overcome, and this can require a distinctive kind of effort, 
namely, that of remaining steadfast in your thoughts. But just as in 
scenarios where the relevant action is already underway, the activity of 
bringing the resolution to awareness and refusing to alter it is not sufficient 
for causally initiating, sustaining, and controlling the requisite bodily 
capacities in the manner demanded by the resolution. In fact, the 
resolution itself, just like the relevant desires, beliefs, and intentions, is not 
causally sufficient for this. It seems that you are causally responsible for 
this, inasmuch as through your exertion of effort you are initiating, 
sustaining, and controlling the activity of your bodily capacities and the 
relevant action, in light of the resolution that you have called to mind, and 
in addition to your act of refusing to alter it.  
Notice that for the proponent of the Humean and Modified Humean 
Accounts of action, the explanation of action requires that we refer only to 
your states of mind in which your desires, beliefs, or intentions are present, 
rather than to you, the agent. Indeed, the connection between both Humean 
Accounts and the philosophical commitments of David Hume himself are 
particularly relevant here.13 Famously, Hume denied that there was any 
such thing as you qua agent (or “the self”), in addition to the states of 
mind (or “perceptions of the mind”) that are present to awareness at any 
given moment in time, connected by what he described as the Principles of 
Association. It seems that contemporary proponents of both Humean 
Accounts retain an inexplicit commitment to such a picture of the agent. 
By highlighting your active and causal role in cases where you display 
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strength of will in overcoming an urge that threatens to undermine the 
action that you are in the midst of performing, the assumption that we need 
not refer to your causal contribution in our explanation of action is 
problematic.  
Unfortunately, the account of strength of will offered by Holton does 
not fare much better. Although I disagree with the details of his account, 
Holton nevertheless recognizes a distinctive and active causal contribution 
for you, the agent, a role that is made explicit by cases in which you 
display strength of will, as Holton describes that notion. For Holton, by 
recalling a resolution without revising or reevaluating it, you become 
aware of the resolution at precisely the moment when doing so is required 
and, when all goes well, are thereby able to overcome a compelling desire 
to the contrary. But this places severe limitations on the active causal role 
that you play during the performance of your bodily actions, especially in 
cases where what Holton describes as strength of will is not required. It is 
only in cases where you must intervene, so to speak, and overcome the 
force of a potent desire, that we see a distinctively active and causal role 
for you during your performance of an action. For Holton, when strength 
of will is not required, the strongest of your desires, beliefs, and intentions 
cause the action that you perform. This can be understood as a 
commitment to a kind of psychological determinism, in which bodily 
actions are causally determined by your desires, beliefs, intentions, and 
other such motivational factors, rather than you, the agent.14 It is the 
underlying commitment to this claim that is the most problematic aspect of 
Holton’s account of strength of will.   
5. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have presented and further supported Richard 
Holton’s novel criticism of both the Humean and the Modified Humean 
Accounts of action, and claimed that, although headed in the right 
direction, the positive account of strength of will offered by Holton 
requires emendation. In particular, I argued that, on Holton’s account of 
strength of will, we are left wanting an explanation of how, exactly, you 
increase the motivational efficacy of a resolution simply by bringing it to 
awareness without revision or reevaluation, and that Holton’s account does 
not appear applicable to cases where you resist a strong desire that 
threatens to undermine the action that you are in the midst of performing 
and have resolved to complete. When we limit our conception of 
willpower to the kinds of cases that Holton considers, we limit ourselves 
to thinking of willpower as a cognitive capacity limited to the mental 
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action of refusing to revise or alter a resolution. In response to these 
difficulties, I suggested that what’s missing from the account of strength of 
will presented by Holton is acknowledgement of the wider role of your 
exertion of effort, as evinced by cases where you force yourself to 
continue performing an action that is already underway as you resist a 
potent desire to the contrary, in addition to those sorts of scenarios 
described by Holton, where you display strength of will in overcoming a 
potent desire that threatens to undermine a prior resolution.15 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Holton (1999, 2003, 2009). 
2 Note that the accounts of action in question are an instance of what J. David 
Velleman (1992) has dubbed the standard story of action. Both accounts depict 
bodily actions as events that are caused by the onset of those of your beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and other motivational factors that make intelligible your 
performance of the action in question. Part of Holton’s interest in these accounts is 
whether they can explain your ability to adhere to a resolution in the face of a 
strong desire to the contrary, given the way that they account for the causation of 
action. See Holton (2003, p. 40). 
3 Proponents of this account include Davidson (2001).  
4 Holton cites the work of Michael Bratman (1989). Note that when Holton 
presents both accounts of action, he does not specify what it means to say of a 
belief, desire, intention, or other motivational factor that it is “strongest”. Very 
roughly put, we can assume that all else being equal, for one desire, A, to be 
stronger than another desire, B, is for you to be disposed to act upon A rather than 
B, where you believe that each desire can be satisfied by performing a specific 
action.  
5 Defenders of a desire-based option include Brandt (1988) and Mele (1987, 1998, 
2003).  
6 Defenders of a belief-based account include Pettit and Smith (1993); Kennett and 
Smith (1996, 1997) and Kennett (2001).  
7 For Holton, the difference between the reconsideration of a resolution and the 
revision of a resolution is this: to revise a resolution is to alter it in some way; to 
reconsider a resolution is to suspend it and thereby open oneself to the possibility 
of revising it. In order to refuse to reconsider a resolution and thereby to abide by 
its dictates in the presence of a compelling desire to do otherwise, Holton thinks 
that one must actively exercise this distinct cognitive capacity. 
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8 Holton does not put the point precisely in this way, but I think it is the most 
perspicuous way to do so. As I shall argue below, this aspect of Holton’s account 
of strength of will is problematic.  
9 Holton cites Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice (1994, pp. 151ff). 
10 Holton cites empirical literature on what is called “ego depletion”. See 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998, pp. 1252-65).  
11 Holton cites Muraven, Baumeister and Tice (1999).  
12 It is important to note that there are interesting normative issues related to 
strength of will, such as whether there are conditions in which it would be 
inappropriate for you to adhere to a resolution, say, that I shall here set aside. My 
worries with the account that Holton offers concern only its causal dimension.  
13 See Hume (1739-40, p. 252). 
14 Note that “psychological determinism” is distinct from “physical determinism”, 
the latter of which is a claim that some physicists and philosophers are in the 
business of investigating.  
15 For helpful discussion of earlier versions of this paper, I thank Akeel Bilgrami, 
Carol Rovane, Taylor Carman, Janet Metcalfe, Mario De Caro, Anubav 
Vasudevan, Marco J. Nathan, Brian H. Kim, Alex Madva, Katie Gasdaglis, 
Katherine Rickus, and Andrei Buckareff.  
 
 
 
 
 
